WORD AND WOR(L)D: THREE CONTEMPLATIONS ON THE LETTERBOX PROJECT

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The Letterbox is a constructed work of theory. It consists of "slices" of transparent films containing components of letters of the alphabet. Each sliced grouping could be slid into the "box," which is a construction of multiple tiers stacked vertically. When viewed in "elevation," the construction is innocuous, appearing "building-like." When viewed in "plan," the transparent core of the stacks are seen, revealing the multi-layered lettering and its components (Fig. 3). Various combinations of transparent slices produce different compositional images as components of "letter-pieces" mix.

The Letterbox is a "constructed contemplation" on the relationship between thinking, making and materiality. And in this paper which accompanies the Letterbox, we offer three explicit "contemplations," each viewing the Letterbox from a different vantage point in its theoretical relationship to architecture.

In all three "contemplations," the Letterbox is at once both a material metaphor as well as a critical commentary. It is a metaphor in that it attempts to diagram in material terms what "the mind" in the West is taken to be. As such, it posits a linkage between the architecture of the mind and the subsequent empirical architecture of our hands, that is to say, the architecture of the built realm. It is a critical commentary in that it points out the shortcomings of this approach. It does this by questioning whether or not this at-once strange (but also strangely familiar) material object before us is in fact the only possibility of the mind-material connection. After all, the thing *looks* like a building of some sort. And what turns on this question is this: if there are other possibilities, how would an architecture yielded from those possibilities "look" in the material realm? Would they also have the same "familiar" appearance? And then there is this: does the level of "rectangular familiarity" we demand in our buildings have anything to do with a motivic need we have to somehow see the workings of our minds empirically before us—so that, this being the case, our constructed forms, for all of our theoretical talk of a deference to the organic nature around us when making architecture, are actually always already a departure from that nature?

We recognize that a "paper" accompanying the Letterbox is itself a commentary on the separation between making, rooted in the Greek term *tekne*, and theory, rooted in the term *theoria*. We will define these terms, and what we mean by "the separation," in the context of the contemplations upon the Letterbox. From there we will comment upon the connections between the Letterbox to word and mind, to materiality and "jointure," and to architecture-as-symptom.

Our word *art* (whatever that is) is usually traced to *tekne*, and yet the very word *art* bespeaks of the separation. This


Figure 1: The Letterbox

separation is nothing but a result of the kind of understanding of the mind which the Letterbox illustrates. *Tekne* pointed to an originary unity of making and thinking, a simultaneity which Heidegger tried to capture by saying that the word pointed to "something poetic" and that, as such, it involved a "bringing-forth."[1] The emphasis is upon spontaneity. One result of this is the well known fact that, for the Greek culture in antiquity, there did not exist a separate class of things called art. Rather, *tekne* was simply a consideration of doing well, or making well, in every facet of life: hence the *tekne* of agriculture, the *tekne* of war, of medicine, of life.[2] The other term, *theoria* (verb *theorein*), is itself a consolidation of a host of older Greek terms having to do with sight. The older terms pointed to attributes of the seen object as opposed to sight as an activity of the perceiving subject.[3] The word *theorein*, meaning "to be a spectator," started to shift the emphasis towards the perceiver. Later, it took on the meaning of "to contemplate," and thus we begin to have an emergence in the Greek language of the activity of a subject's reflection upon an object as opposed to the subject being merely a receiver of external effects. Thus started the tradition of our word *theory*, understood to mean the disciplined and analytic reflection upon an object which is separate from the object itself. Making and the theory of making have ever since been two separate propositions.

As a constructed metaphor, the Letterbox seeks to

illustrate the root of this separation, which we propose to be the Western conception of the human mind. It is instructive to note that, in early Greek thought, there did not exist a concept of an immaterial motivic entity which acted as the seat of human consciousness and identity. For Homer, for example, "...a tension in the soul has no more reality for him than a tension in the eye... the predicates of the soul remain completely within the bounds set for physical organs...As a result there is in Homer no genuine refection, no dialogue of the soul with itself."[4] As late as Aristotle, the idea of perception was still such that to see an object is for the sense organ to be materially changed by that object.[5] There is very little ground for locating the idea of what we would call *consciousness* in this theory.

By the time of Descartes, however, this was totally changed. Descartes' only assurance that he *is* was founded upon the reality of "*I think.*"[6] And the dependability of the immaterial "I think" to accurately represent external material objects is by appeal to a benevolent God, who would not lead us astray.[7] Kant critiqued this assurance as unfounded, because it was unprovable by reason.[8] But by dismissing the substantiality of the soul, Kant erected the architectonic structure of the mind. In other words, with Kant, we have the first emergence in Western thought of the mind as an *a priori* construction of parts, independent of the empirical objects external to it, which it mediates in the process of producing knowledge of the world, now conceived as a network of *appearances*. We will come back to this, in the form of critique, later in the paper.

But at this level of contemplation, the Letterbox is a material metaphor of the Kantian proposal of the architectonics of the mind.[9] (See Fig. 4). With Kant, the subject-object bifurcation of Descartes is solved—but at the expense of another bifurcation. This new bifurcation is *within* the cognitive apparatus itself. As exemplified by the Letterbox, the mind as structure necessarily becomes the mind as container. A container of what? Of theoretical, moral and aesthetic determinations.[10] Space here does not allow for an explication of Kant's overall critical system. But for example, Kant says that propositional determinations (such as "this is an umbrella") requires the faculty of understanding, with the concepts which reside in it, engaging with the sensibility, the standing capacity to receive empirical impressions from the outside.[11] For our purposes, we see here the "stuff" contained in the mind being distinguished from the container itself. Kant does not address the container as such, and this appears as a curious kind of blind spot in his otherwise obsessively thorough system. He does pay repeated deference to what he variously calls the realm of the "unconditioned," "the permanent," or "the supersensible." This of course is his realm of noumena, which is not accessible to us *because the contents of the mind have always already mediated between the actual thing-in-itself and our reception of it.* And so, for example, he says of the faculties of understanding and sensibility, that they are the two stems from which all human knowledge comes, but that their own origin is from a common "*but to us unknown, root.*"[12]

In the Letterbox, the dichotomy between the structure-container and the "stuff" contained in it is made explicit. But its explicitness underlines the question: what is it? What is the unconditioned pre-theoretical structure? Does the proposition of the unconditioned point to a profound and as-yet unconquered domain, or does it raise a problem which, for example, Homer did not have to face—a problem which is a


Figure 2: Transparent slices

Figure 3: Letterbox elevation and plans

problem because the formulation of what the mind is is in fact problematic?

CONTEMPLATION I: WORD AND WOR(L)D

Bruno Snell argues that the early Greeks, "either in their language or in the visual arts, grasp the body as a unit." These early figures show a convergence of exaggerated limbs arriving at a point, with no central torso which would strengthen the suggestion of an understanding of body. "It seems... as if language aims progressively to express the essence of an act, but

Figure 4: Letterbox: a material metaphor of the architectonics of the mind

is at first unable to comprehend it because it is a function, and as such neither tangibly apparent nor associated with certain unambiguous emotions. As soon, however, as it is recognized and has received a name, *it has come into existence.*"[4] This suggestion of the non-existence of an object (object here meant to denote any propositional determination) previous to the assignment of a name to that object is a forceful rebuttal to the vision of Kant. Simply put, if word determines the existence of object, then the existence of mind-as-object necessarily depends upon the word-making "stuff" it contains. In other words, it is not mind which enables word, but rather word which enables mind.

This has fundamental consequence for the world which we perceive. Kant was right in that we perceive it as a (mediated) appearance. But he arrives upon this appearance by means of the agency of the structurated mind as an *a priori*. But is the *a priori* mind itself unmediated if its very existence depends upon the words which make it a propositional given? It seems that there is ground to consider a simultaneity of word and mind. And in this case, there is an interchangeability of word and world. Indeed, word is wor(l)d. World does not precede word.

This leads directly to the "building-like" appearance of the Letterbox. At the level of a building metaphor, the Letterbox is a critique of architecture's over-emphasis upon material buildings in general as opposed to the immateriality of the life which they contain. To put it another way, Western architecture has always entertained an emphasis upon the container at the expense of the contained. A cursory survey of any textbook in architectural history will reveal this: how many of the photographs of the canonized buildings (the Villa Savoye, the Robie House, etc.) have *people* in them? And this tendency to lionize the container, we argue, is a kind of a materially instantiated paradigm of a philosophy of mind which sees the mind (as container) as a structure previous to words (the contained) which in turn describe a world. And so implicit in this is architectural theory's assumption that physical *appearances*, that is, physical containers shaped in a certain way, will lead to a

world. It circumvents even the possibility that it is the *word*, which this assumption holds as the contained, that make world.

Consider Le Corbusier's Marseille Block and his design of the Voisin Plan (Fig. 5).[14] His vision of the urban utopia is predicated upon the notion of gathering all the people into Letterbox-like containers, so that green land could be opened up in between. Such a vision has been attempted in many urban renewal projects. And many of them, like the infamous Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis, has been an unmitigated disaster. Indeed, the International Style, the blind-to-regionalism juggernaut which has dominated architectural design and theory for much of this century, is the best example of this "container" paradigm. And thankfully it seems to have vented its steam.

CONTEMPLATION II: THE (STORY OF THE) FIRST JOINT, OR, THE FIRST JOINT VERSUS STORY

If this container/contained paradigm of the mind and its creations, a paradigm which we consider faulty, finds material reflections in actual built form, it leads us to reconsider the interface between the material and immaterial realms. By material here we mean the physical-concrete, while by immaterial we mean that which lacks the attributes of the physical-concrete. We recall that the Cartesian location of this interface is between the immaterial mind (the cogito) and material (extended) objects. For Descartes, the mental apparatus is immaterial while the materially extended object is real-in-itself. The Kantian critical philosophy shifted the interface by implicitly arguing for the reality (albeit justified only by the "unknown") of the cognitive apparatus while relegating what we see to the realm of mere "appearances." In either case the problem is a question of *jointure.* That is to say, both models presume a line of demarcation which necessitates that the divided realms of the material and immaterial be hinged, or joined, in some fashion. The inviolability of the two realms are not questioned. The emphasis is upon the firewall which separates the two, on the one hand, while on the other the task is to explain how the two zones are nevertheless in communication.

As noted the Letterbox, at one level, is a material illustration of this dichotomous tension. Are there alternatives to this reading of the state of affairs? One way is to view the Letterbox as *story.* What we have in any story are both the propositional constructions which make the story determinate, and hence individuated, from any other story, as well as the indeterminate associations which are essential to giving the story universal appeal and applicability. In Shakespeare's *Othello*, just to offer an example, we have the determinate figures of the cast (Othello, Iago, Desdemona, et.al.) as well as all of the determinate settings in which the story takes place, along with the determinate events of the storyline. But we also have the universally indeterminate shapes of human relationships, of emotions which spill over as jealousy, envy, innocence, and the like. These indeterminate universals spill over into every determinate enactment of the play, so much so that they make every enactment an original "here and now."[15] The physical settings are only of secondary import.

By seeing the Letterbox as story, the problem of the container/contained is conquered. And Stephen Daniel proposes that this story element (what he calls myth—see footnote 14), is part and parcel of all determinate constructions. In other

words, on this view, there is no clear line of demarcation between material and immaterial. The assumed first joint must be examined as to whether or not it was a robust assumption. Daniel argues that this involvement with story was at the heart of none other than the rationalist Descartes' musings. Descartes had a fascination with "dreams, myth, fable, and poetic imagination."[16] Daniel cites the Descartes of the *Discourse on Method*:

...But regarding this Treatise simply as a tale, or if you prefer, a fable in which, amongst certain things which may be imitated, there are possibly others also which it would not be right to follow, I hope that it be of use to some without being hurtful to any, and that all will thank me for my frankness...[17]

This timid tone is not so that Descartes could avoid censure, as happened to Galileo, but rather that Descartes was boldly touching upon, and accommodating for, something essential in the nature of philosophical discourse. This was that the creation of philosophic determinations, what Daniel actually calls poetic invention, "...is not *creatio ex nihilo*." Rather, "the situation always begins with some chaos upon which ingenium (the ability of the mind to cognize new relationships) can exercise itself in coming to know itself or a world..."[18]

This opens the way for a second level contemplation of the Letterbox-as-built-form. This is the reception of the Letterbox *just as* story, without any prerequisites for its legitimacy framed by questions such as "What is it?" or "What is it used for?" (Fig. 6). For these kinds of questions to be posed, a *joint* would have to be presupposed. It would be the *first* joint between the immaterial substratum and the material world of propositions, scientific precision, and practical utility. But the Letterbox, viewed as story, is just a "telling." And by its telling a world is given. The "telling" in the case of the Letterbox, of course, is in physical concrete form, as opposed to the telling of actual stories by means of the spoken word. And just as a story told but not heard creates no world, the Letterbox made but unexperienced (visually and by the other senses) is not a world either. But once the Letterbox-as-story is so engaged, it is a world.

The contemplation of the Letterbox as story underscores the reality of all of architecture as having a storied dimension. The making of architecture is always a challenge to the supposed tyranny of this first joint between the immaterial and the material. This is because a building, for all of its propositional precision, always spills over and engages story. Never mind the more erudite arguments which we could marshall to support this claim. Just think of the old inns in the United States which claim that "George Washington slept here." Why does someone's visit some two centuries ago, if indeed it actually happened (and whether or not it did is not the point) make so much difference to a physical place? Because it is a gateway to the presence-of-story, and as such, it conquers and disproves the absolute tyranny of the first joint. It infuses the material given-ness of the place with something else from the substratum which reminds us that, for us, meaning does not only reside in stones and plaster.

Think of the cathedrals. In these cases, the centuries of years have accumulated a story-content to these structures which overwhelm any propositional characteristics they offer (which are many) when physically "seen" on any one day. The saints and political figures of old aspired to be buried in these edifices, so


Figure 5: Corbusier "boxes:" Viosin plan

that the cathedrals, as great storied ships which sail through the halls of time, could carry their negated (physical) beings with them. In this way the men of old wished to be incorporated into the story-presence of these buildings, defeating the first joint once again.

When a building is physically seen at any one moment, that sight is only the small intersection of a huge longitudinal axis of the life of that building through time—an axis which is not accessible to propositionalism and empirical science. Our visit to the cathedral today does not conquer the first joint: we are on this (the material) side of it. But the building as a world conquers the first joint, in that, as world, it does not recognize any discontinuity, but rather exists as a storied whole. And it is the force of this story, with its universally immaterial dimensions, which seeps out at us, precisely suggesting that what we have come a long way to see has been worth it. And so, in the same fashion in which Ernst Cassirer speaks of mythical space as intrinsic to our reception of mundane space in the world (because of the human need to set up "specific barriers to which his feeling and his will attach themselves..."[19]), the built form is the product of that act of demarcation, and it becomes the focus of that which is considered special.

For all of its rhetorical deference to the new age of science, and hence the shedding of any need for ornament,[20] Modernist architecture at its core reflects this attempt to make the built form a presence-of-story. Whereas past theories more or less incorporated the unseen and the immaterial as an unreflective given which must nevertheless be striven for (wit-

Figure 6: What is it?

ness, for example, the florid and theatrical architecture of the late Baroque), Modernist architecture, precisely because it eschewed the possibility of such ephemeral realities, unwittingly produced storied objects nevertheless. Why is this so? For this reason: architectural theory previous to this century looked to the natural order as a paradigm of dwelling which human dwelling was to fit into. With the intoxication of the machine age first upon the scene, the theorists at the beginning of this century, for the first time in the history of theory, called not for a fitting into the natural order, but rather for the creation of an alternate nature altogether. "It is...the utterly abstract which expresses exactly all that is human...what is related to the senses does not attain the status of the intellectual and has...to be considered as belonging to a lower level of human culture." So said van Doesburg in 1922.[21] And here is Mondrian in 1917: "...the life of contemporary cultivated man is turning gradually away from nature...it becomes more and more abstract life."[23] Scheerbart, decades before Buckminster Fuller, envisioned a world under glass.[23] Sant'Elia envisioned cities of concrete, steel and glass, a vision which has come true.[24] And in Russia, A. Vesnin eulogized the engineer over anything which the artist could do.[25] But the immaterial seeps through. And when the natural cosmos has been deleted as a source of the presence of the immaterial, the concrete forms themselves take on fabular dimensions.

Thus, the Letterbox *just as* a fabular (storied) form. And the strangeness of the Letterbox is because we are not accustomed to seeing the fabular abstracted and in front of us as a propositional reduction. But here it is. The Letterbox is a material paradigmatic sketch of modern architecture.

CONTEMPLATION III: ARCHITECTURE AS SYMPTOM

The move to create a substitute nature in this century has resulted, at the close of this century, in the phenomenon that the architectural object is viewed as a symptom of a larger condition. This is a new development in the evolution of theory, and it should not be missed. Previous to this century, theory had always been a means either of explaining the object produced or of influencing its production. In other words, the architectural object was, as it were, the end of the line. It was the object of contemplation, and also the source of authorial validity in some form. For example, consider Alberti's notion of a perfect building's beauty: if the lineaments (in thought) and matter have been perfectly integrated, one cannot take anything away from the product without detrimentally effecting the statement of beauty.[26] This is no longer the case in the late twentieth century. Consider Tschumi's statements on his *Parc de la Villette*. The work is nothing but a symptom of society's ills:

...Madness serves as a constant point of reference throughout the Urban Park of La Villette because it appears to illustrate a characteristic situation at the end of the twentieth century—that of disjunctions and dissociations between use, form and social values... The contemporary city and its many parts...are made to correspond with the dissociated elements of schizophrenia...At La Villette (or anywhere else, for that matter) there is no longer any relationship possible between...architecture and meaning.[27]

Well, the last sentence is not true. It is not that architecture has no relationship to meaning *at all.* What Tschumi means to say is that an architectural object is no longer the locus of meaning. It's meaning is now *symptomatic* meaning. It is evidence .. of the madness and schizophrenia of late twentieth century life.

Within this rubric of meaning, the architectural object is permitted to be *strange.* For all of Tschumi's claims that the contemporary city is characterized by schizophrenia, schizophrenia after all is still strange. Why is this so? Because it is still viewed in the context of a nature which was originally given, as opposed to within the context of the substitute nature of early twentieth century theory. And the originary nature has a coherence and an order (what Kant calls nature-as-technic, that is to say, nature as the product of a purposive Artist—even though we do not know, and could not know, who that Artist is[28]) which is able to render a verdict on something which is foreign to its ordered structurations. That foreign something then stands out as an entity with its own systemic reality, but it is a reality which is counter to original nature's reality. There is then an opposition, in which the schizophrenic object stands boldly out from the natural backdrop.

The Letterbox invites us to contemplate the strangeness of the contemporary architectural object and to consider its autonomous formal character (Fig. 7). It raises the question of whether the product of the machine, the undergirding force behind the New Nature of the twentieth century, could really be considered a part of the long lineage of the products of the human hand—or whether it should be assessed as really a new

sort of something. It raises the old Ruskinian debate of whether an architecture made, as it were, without the hands of "happy carvers," could really bring about a "happy" and moral society.[29] After all, taken on its own as an object of production, the Letterbox is the not end of the line of explication. In other words, it is not an Albertian final statement, in which nothing could be taken away without risk to its claims of beauty, or any other authorial abstraction. The Letterbox is rather a *dependent* something, which is to say that it is necessarily a piece of evidence of some larger workings, and without privileged knowledge into those workings we could not have a final determination as to what this thing really is.

At this level of contemplation, the Letterbox is a symptom. Its delicate internal workings of the letter and the word, the substance which in the first Contemplation we considered to be the essential mind-word-world identity, is at this level of contemplation an irrelevant matter. It's workings have become the domain of what the modern world calls the private realm, and it is tucked away (here literally) into the anonymity of the box (Fig. 8). And the box has re-emerged as the unexplained mysterious container, here in quite a different sense than before. Here it is no longer the container of precious propositions, but rather the container-itself-as-symptom. In the old cathedrals, there are carvings hidden in niches so small that it is not possible to be viewed by human eyes. Of course, these carvings were reserved for the eyes of God. Modern architecture also has word/world components hidden away within the tyranny of the box. We do not see them. But there is no longer any God to see them either.

Figure 7: Letterbox as contemporary architectural object

CONCLUSION: TIME AND SPACE

The phenomenologist Edward S. Casey has made the point that today's developed societies are motivated by time awareness, while pre-industrial societies are oriented by space awareness. Casey cites the example of how the Puluwatan native of the Caroline Islands of Micronesia could navigate great distances on the open seas without any navigational equipment save his own body's sensations of the climate and the water.[30] This is a different twist to time and space than Kant's proposition that both are required to receive the external empirical world. But this shift in emphasis is itself the point: in an existence (as we understand it) which is enabled by both the "a priori intuitions" of time and space, other factors enter in to cause the actual ordering of empirical lives to be dictated by one element or the other—indeed, Casey argues that Kant's own formulation was posited when time had already taken the ascendancy. And with the ascendancy of one or the other element, the empirical world is also ordered according to that element's dictates. For example, the invention of the motor car, more than any other innovation, shaped the *space* of the modern city. It enabled the suburban residential ring around the urban business center. The (now possible) twenty miles from home to office become a thirty minute proposition by the motor car. And thus buildings tended to not be designed as visual anchors of urban nodes any longer, but rather as billboards to be driven by, as Venturi argued for in the early years of Postmodernism.[31]

We would push Casey's argument one step further. The end of the twentieth century is witnessing radical alterations to both sensed space as well as time, and this has tremendous implications for architecture—implications which probably none of us today could fully grasp. For the modern human being, the gospel of technological utility as the determinator of the world has so permeated our assumptions about quality of life (nay, even the possibility of life) that it has redefined both sensed space and time. A mere twenty years ago, it was a marvel that a business executive, by means of air travel, could conduct meetings on both coasts of the United States in a single day. But now, by means of the computer and facsimile machines, a "project team" could be located on three continents without any member of the team actually leaving his or her place of residence. With the computer, what took months of tedious production drawings for a building could now be done overnight. When space and time have been conquered in these senses, the old paradigm of fitting the built form into the context of a nature of mountains and valleys, of trees, flowers and picturesque vistas, and the like, is sapped of theoretical (if not practical) force. Time's influence upon architectural form is also compromised, because past signatures of time have always been indexed to spatial implications relative to the scale of the human being as s/he interacts with the built form. Now there is a good chance the interacting individual may be miles away from the building in question (the building, say, which houses the computer linkages).

The result is an architecture which attempts to puncture this universal uniformity and anonymity of an electronicized "nature" of placed-ness and timed-ness. And this is done with a storied form, with little connection to the *placed* qualities of the physical environment around it. It is rather a monolithic statement existing on its own, with its own (usually obscure) reasons for being. It is a stranger in a strange land, keeping its own counsel hidden within itself, much like this Letterbox.

Figure 8: To be tucked away in the tyranny of the box

NOTES

1. Heidegger, Martin. "The Question Concerning Technology" in *Basic Writings*. ed. D.F. Krell. (New York: Harper Collins, 1993). Heidegger, as he was wont to do, uses an architectural illustration to buttress what he means: "Whoever builds a house...reveals what is to be brought forth...This revealing gathers together in advance the aspect and the matter of...house. Thus what is decisive in *tekne* does not at all lie in making and manipulating, nor in the using of means, but rather in the revealing mentioned before. It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that *tekne* is bringing forth..." p.319

2. See Kristeller, Paul O. "The Modern System of the Arts" in *Renaissance Thought and the Arts: Collected Essays*, 1964. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). pp.166-174

3. Snell, Bruno. *The Discovery of the Mind*. trans. T.G. Rosenmeyer. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953). pp.4-5

4. ibid. p.19

5. Aristotle. *On the Soul*, II5, 418a. trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred. (New York, Penguin, 1986). pp.171-172. "And, in the way we have said, the sense faculty is like the actual sense-object—it is affected as being unlike but on being affected it becomes like and is such as what acts on it." See also translator's comments on the lack of the notion of consciousness on p. 1696.

6. Descartes, Rene. *Discourse on Method and the Meditations*. Trans. F. E. Sutcliffe. (New York: penguin, 1968, 1980). p. 58. The *Discourse on Method* first published in 1637. p. 53-54

7. ibid. p.58

8. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. B423 - B424, 1781. trans. Norman Kemp Smith. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965). p.378

9. "Architectonic" is a Kantian term. A832, B860. pp. 653-665

10. Space does not allow for an in depth explication of Kant's system. Suffice it to say that the first *Critique* (of Pure Reason) deals with the determinate judgments of theoretical reason, or reason as such. It answers the question, "What can I know?" The second *Critique* (of Practical Reason) deals with the determinations of the moral law. It answers the question, "What ought I to do?" The third *Critique* (of Judgment) deals with the indeterminate judgments of aesthetic pleasure and taste. It answers the question, "What should I consider beautiful?"

11. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A50, B74-A52, B76. ibid. pp. 92-93. A well known Kantian formula:"Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind..." *Intuitions* in the Kantian jargon are the received sense impressions from the empirical realm (this excludes the a priori intuitions of time and space).

12. ibid. A15, B29. p.61, italics added.

13. Snell. *op.cit.* p.7, italics added.

14. Le Corbusier, *Towards a New Architecture*. (New York: Dover). Stephen Daniel has argued for this "here and now" quality in myth. I chose not to use the word myth here because it unnecessarily connects to many other realms of discourse which I do not think is relevent. Daniel, Stephen. *Myth and Modem Philosophy*. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). Daniel defines myth as "a particular mode or group of functions, operative within discourse, that highlight how communication and even thought are themselves possible" (pp. 3-4). What he means by this is the idea that proposition—making necessarily requires something to make propositionsfrom. And proposition—making is at the root of all of human disciplinary activity, from language formation, to science, to philosophizing. And of course architecture is itself an intensely propositional activity. Daniel argues that myth is the evidence of this pre-theoretic something from which the human being draws to formulate his categorizations. In this kind of relationship, there is no history as such, because reality only emerges upon the telling of the myth. There is therefore no linear "chain" of reality, each link being some kind of causally psroduced proposition, which could be construed as history. 16. Daniel, *op.cit.* p.63. "Before Descartes could provide a method for philosophical reflection or the rules for the rational direction of the mind, he had to show the antecedent conditions that made such an enterprise possible. Rational discourse presumes a linguistic network that provides the sense-based background of meanings and the code of rules for their use and application. Because myth and fable do not presume such a prior codification of meaning but rather are self-conscious expressions of the need to establish a system of linguistic signs, they are prephilosophic to the extent that philosophic reflection relies on such a previously established system. To the extent that philosophy seeks to extend or revise such a sign s7ystem, it recaptures the spirit of its mythic origins..."

17. ibid. p.80. Daniel's source is from *Discourse on Method in Philosophical Works*, 83. Cf. Etienne Gilson, *Rene Descartes, Discours de la Methode: Texte et Commentaire* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1925), 98-99. 18

18. ibid. p.81

19. Cassirer, Emst. *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Mythical Thought*. Vol 2 (of 3). trans. R. Manheim. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, c. 1955). p.85

20. See, for example, Loos, Adolf. "Ornament and Crime," 1908

21. van Doesburg, T. *De Stijl V*, 1922. Quoted from Kruft, Hanno-Walter. *History of Architectural Theory—From Vitruvius to the Present*. (New York; Princeton Architectural Press, 1994). p.374

22. Mondrian, Piet. De Stijl I, 1917. Quoted from ibid. p.379

23. Scheerbart, Paul. "Glass Architecture" in Ulrich Conrads, ed. *Programs and Manifestoes of 20th Century Architecture*. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1971). pp.32-33

24. Sant'Elia, Antonio and Filippo Tommaso Marinetti. "Futurist Architecture" in ibid. pp.34-38

25. Vesnin, Alexandr. "Credo" in *Art Into Life: Russian Constructivism 1914-1932*. (New York: Rizzoli, 1990). p.68

26. Alberti, Leon Battista. *On the Art of Building in Ten Books*, 1450. trans. J. Rykwert, R. Travernor, N. Leach. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1994). Book IX, chap. 5.

27. Tschumi, Bernard. *Cinegramme Folie: Le Pare de la Villette*. (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 1987). See pp. 16, 17, 49

28. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Judgment*. trans. W. Pluhar. Section 78, 410.

29. Ruskin, John. "The Lamp of Life," Section XXIV, in *The Seven Lamps of Architecture*, 1849. (New York: Dover, 1989). p.173

30. Casey, Edward S. *Getting back Into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Renewed World*. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993). pp. 26-28

31. Venturi, Robert, Steven Izenour, Denise Scott Brown. *Learning From Las Vegas*. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972)